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In Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, authentication of a device is of upmost importance for applications of Internet
ofThings. As traditional authentication schemes always assume the presence of a person, most authentication technologies cannot
be applied in machine-centric M2M context. In this paper, we make the first attempt to formally model the authentication in
M2M. We first model four attacking adversaries that can formulate all possible attacks in M2M, which are channel eavesdropping
attack, credential compromise attack, function compromise attack, and ghost compromise attack. Next, we propose four models to
tackle those corresponding adversaries, namely, credential-based model, machine-metrics-based model, reference-based model,
and witness-based model. We also illustrate several concrete attacking methods and authentication approaches. We proof the
authentication security for all proposed models and compare them for clarity. Our models present soundness and completeness
in terms of authentication security, which can guide the design and analysis of concrete authentication protocols. Particularly, we
construct a uniform authentication framework for M2M context and point out all possible authentication mechanisms in M2M.
1. Introduction
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication is a typical
communication fashion in the Internet of Things (IoT). It
has been envisioned as one of the most promising Internet-
accessing approaches in the IoT for long-distance remote
devices. M2M networking interface enables wide area com-
munications for mobile or static devices, so that it is quit
convenient and easy to deploy remote devices rapidly. M2M
thus becomes a typical communication method for most IoT
applications such as remote environmental sensing, long-
distance controlling, moving object locating, and tracing.
Besides, M2M communication further incorporates various
novel applications such as smart grid [1], tele-medicine [2],
and smart vehicles [3].
As remote devices are always located faraway in unat-
tended or malicious environments, it is very likely that the
devicesmay be hacked by attackers. For example, the software
system in devices may be injected or infected by certain
malicious codes, which maymodify or fabricate forthcoming
outgoing data. Moreover, the devices may perform arbitrary
(Byzantine) misbehavior after being compromised. Thus, the
data sent by remote sensing devices must be authenticated.
Otherwise, remote receivers in the other end will receive a lot
of garbage information and consequently respond falsely.
We note that the authentication in M2M context is quite
different from traditional authentication. Roughly speaking,
traditional authentication usually assume the entity being
authenticated is a person, or human is involved in authen-
tication procedures. Simply speaking, the authentication
methods usually rely on three aspects: “what you know, what
you have, and who you are.” As the entity authentication
in M2M is not a person, the traditional methods such as
“what you know and who you are” may not be applied.
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For example, password-based authentication (by manually
inputting password) cannot be applied in M2M context.
The biometric-based authentication such as fingerprint
recognition cannot be applied in M2M context neither.
Furthermore, traditional authentication methods for
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) may not be able to
smoothly migrate to M2M situations.That is, the authentica-
tionmethods inWSNs usually rely on certain secrete creden-
tials in cryptographic building blocks, for example, secrete
keys for symmetric key encryptions, or private keys for digital
signatures. Those secrete credentials are stored in devices
or chips attached to devices (e.g., smart cards). However,
such an authentication method still cannot defend against
all aforementioned attacks. For example, when devices are
compromised, those credentials will be revealed by attackers,
by hacking the devices or injecting malicious codes. It again
shows the distinction between M2M authentication and
person-based authentication where entities (i.e., persons)
usually are assumed uncompromising.
Therefore, the entity authentication inM2Mcontextmust
be reconsidered and reinspected. We also need to explore the
tailored authentication methods in M2M context, to guaran-
tee a stronger authentication (that will be formally defined
later), in case the devices are compromised and credentials
are exposed. Besides, the formal models for authentication
are appealing, as the formalmodels can guarantee the security
strength and clarify the core part out from various application
details. Unfortunately, such problem has not been explored
thoroughly until now, to the best of our knowledge.
Currently, although several related works start to concen-
trate onM2M security problems [4–8], the strong authentica-
tionmethods inM2M have not been thoroughly explored yet
[9–13]. In this paper, we make the first attempt to figure out
the abstract models for M2M context. We adapt a formal and
rigorous method used in modern or theoretic cryptography,
to strictly state, present, and analyze the security of authen-
tication. More specifically, we firstly formulate attack models
regarding to device compromising in M2M context by using
interactive Turingmachine.We next categorize the classifica-
tions in M2M authentication and their security specification.
Finally, we propose several abstract authentication models to
address different attacking patterns and proof their security.
All our presentations strictly follow the formal expressions for
better clarity and rigorous generality.
The contributions of the paper are listed as follows: (1)
we strictly formulate the possible attacks and adversaries in
M2M, which facilities to clearly locate the security fragile
point. For example, we point out credential compromising
attack, function compromising attack, and ghost compro-
mising attack; (2) we formulate the general and abstract
authentication models with provable security in M2M con-
text, which figures out the fundamental characteristics of all
possible authenticationmethods inM2M to guide the further
design and security analysis in practices; (3) we point out sev-
eral concrete attacking methods and propose corresponding
authentication approaches to illustrate our models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss the basic assumption andmodels used throughout
the paper. Section 3 provides the detailed description of our
proposedmodels and analysis. Section 4 gives an overview on
relevant prior work. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Problem Formulation
2.1. Network Model. In most M2M communications, there
exists two major entities: devices, denoted as Dev, and a
central server.
Dev is defined to equip following components.
(1) Functional module, denoted as DevFM. It consists
of software and hardware for generating sensing
data, computing meta information, sending reports,
receiving instructions, and acting accordingly. It
usually has three folders in terms of functionality:
(i) a communication module, usually enabling wide
area communications (e.g., GRPS/CDMA/TD-LTE)
to report data to a central server; (ii) a computing
program processing the data; (iii) a storage system
storing relevant code and the data.
(2) Credential module, denoted as DevCM. It con-
sists of software and hardware for identification
and credentials. One typical credential module is
subscriber identification module (SIM) card, which
stores unique identification and secretes credentials
such as keys.
In this paper, we focus on above typical fashion in
M2M communications—from devices to central servers.
It is without loss of generality, because communications
between devices and devices far away in M2M are usually
relayed by a central server. As the devices are equipped with
wide area communication capabilities, multihop M2M relay
within remote devices rarely happen. The relay is usually
unnecessary, as the devices can upload reports directly to
central servers.
Even though multihop relay between devices happens, it
is usually local area wireless communication such as wireless
personal area network (WPAN), for example, Zigbee, orwire-
less local area network. That is, the reasonable architecture
has two tiers: the communication between devices and gate-
ways is WPAN, but the communication between gateways
and a central server isM2M. In this case, the authentication of
devices in the former tier has been explored inWSN commu-
nities and previous solutions can be migrated; the authenti-
cation of gateways in the latter tier is our focus.That is, in this
scenario, we look on gateways as devices in our discussion.
In addition, no matter in which kind of authentication
scenarios, we always assume the peer who authenticates
(i.e., verifier) is trusted or secure. It is a baseline for the
further meaningful discussion. We thus focus on the peer
being authenticated (i.e., prover), which is a device in M2M
scenarios. That is, how to authenticate a device in M2M.
2.2. AttackModel. It is required to consider the situation that
devices may be compromised, as the devices may be always
located in unattended environments. From the viewpoint
of security strength, such assumption for the existence of
stronger adversary will result in stronger security guarantee,
which is mandatory for certain critical applications, such as
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gas emission monitoring and back-bone smart grid. Accord-
ing to the modeling of networks and devices, we classify the
attack models into four folders as follows.
(1) Channel eavesdropping attack, denoted as Attackce.
It is a straightforward attack that adversaries sniff
communication channels and try to subvert authen-
tication methods, for example, revealing credentials.
(2) Credential Compromising Attack, denoted as
Attackcc. In this attack, the credential module is
hacked, exposed, modified, cloned, or replaced by
adversaries.
(3) Function compromising attack, denoted as Attackfc.
In this attack, the functional module is hacked,
exposed,modified, cloned, or replaced by adversaries.
(4) Ghost compromising attack, denoted as Attackgc. In
this attack, the whole device can be hacked, exposed,
modified, cloned, or replaced by adversaries. It can be
looked as the combination of Attackcc and Attackfc.
Note that, the Attackcc and Attackfc may not be concur-
rent. For example, when tamper-proof hardware is applied
for credential module, adversary’s malicious code can only
compromise function module, not credential module.
2.3. Security Definition. Roughly speaking, the secure
authentication in this paper is defined as the interactive
proof between two probabilistic polynomial interactive
Turing machine (ITM) [14].
The ITM being authenticated is called Prover (denoted
as P); the ITM authenticating Prover is called Verifier
(denoted as V). The P and V both have one outgoing
communication tape, one incoming communication tape,
one input computing tape, one output computing tape, and
one inner working tape. They also have other auxiliary tapes
for interaction and security: one identity tape, one security
parameter tape, one random tape, and one-bit activation
tape. In this paper, the outgoing communication tape ofP is
the same with the incoming communication tape of V. For
simplicity, this tape is called interaction tape, denoted asT
𝑖
.
The adversary (denoted as A) is also modeled as an
ITM. In different attack models, adversaries have different
corresponding capabilities. We list them from weaker one to
stronger one incrementally. The stronger one inherently has
the capability of the weaker one.
(1) InAttackce, the adversary is denoted asAce, which can
read and write the interaction tape.
(2) In Attackcc and not in Attackfc, the adversary is
denoted as Acc, which can read and write the work
tape.We assume it inherently has the capability ofAce.
(3) In Attackfc and not in Attackcc, the adversary is
denoted as Afc, which can also read and write input
tape and output tape. We assume it inherently has the
capability of Ace.
(4) In Attackgc, the adversary is denoted as Agc, which
can also read and write all tapes.
As we have already stated, V needs to be secure (or
honest) in authentication semantics.
Environmental ITM (denoted as Z) exists. Z can read
and write input tapes ofP andV. The protocol result is the
output ofZ.
The one interaction betweenP andV can be modeled as
follows.
(1) P writes outgoing communication tapeT
𝑖
;
(2) V reads incoming communication tapeT
𝑖
.
The sequence can be interchangeable. The times of inter-
action may be more than once.
Next, we state the definition of authentication and its
security as follows:
Definition 1 (Authentication). From the transcripts on tape
T
𝑖
byV,V can believe the data is indeed fromP (and data
is not modified). More specifically, from tag in the transcripts
{id, data, tag} on tape T
𝑖
, V can believe data is indeed from
the deviceP with the id without any change.
Definition 2. Security of Authentication of Protocol Π in the
presence of adversary A. From tag󸀠 in {id, data󸀠, tag󸀠} in the
protocol Π’s transcripts that data are tampered to data󸀠 by
adversaryA, the probability that the adversary can foolV to
believe data󸀠 is from the devicePwith id without any change
is negligible.
Define attack experiment AuthFoolA,Π(𝑛) as follows:
(1) run protocolΠ in the presence of adversaryA, where
P andV are both ITM with security parameter 𝑛;
(2) V witnesses A tampered transcripts on tape T
𝑖
−
{id, data󸀠, tag󸀠}, V output 1. That is, V believes that
data󸀠 come from the device P with id without any
change. Otherwise, output 0;
(3) if and only ifV output 1, the experiment output 1.
Definition 3. Authentication protocol Π is secure, if for any
ITMadversaryA, it exists a negligible function negl satisfying
Pr [AuthFoolA,Π (𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl (𝑛) . (1)
Indeed, authentication can be further divided into two
types: entity authentication and message authentication.
Entity authentication is the concentration in this paper. Mes-
sage authentication is however usually required also in com-
munication context and can be attained with entity authenti-
cation together.We thus later do not explicitly split those two.
Definition 4 (Entity Authentication (Message Source Authen-
tication)). From tag in the transcripts {id, data, tag} on tape
T
𝑖
,V can believe data is from the deviceP with id.
Definition 5 (Message Authentication (Message Integrity
Authentication)). From tag in the transcripts {id, data, tag}
on tape T
𝑖
, V can believe data is transferred without any
change.
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Table 1: Notation.
P Prover
V Verifier
cred Credential
id Device identity
data Reporting data
negl(𝑛) Negligible function with parameter 𝑛
We can similarly define the attack experiment and cor-
responding security for entity authentication and message
authentication.
3. Proposed Authentication Models
In this section, we propose a family of models to solve the
authentication problem in M2M context.
We list all major notations used in the remainder of the
paper in Table 1.
3.1. Defending Channel Eavesdropping Attack: Credential-
Based Model (CBM). To defend Attackce, the simplest
authentication model is credential-based model, where the
authentication relies on the knowledge or possession of
certain credentials, for example, secrete keys. The credential-
based model is described as follows:
MSGcbm : P 󳨀→V : {id, data, tag = 𝑓 (cred ‖id‖ data)} ,
V : Verify (id, data, tag) ?= 1,
(2)
where the Verify() is a tag verification function Verify(tag);
MSGcbm is a message fromP toV; cred is a credential such
as a secret key; 𝑓() is a function with following properties.
(1) One-wayness. From 𝑓(cred‖id‖data), it is computa-
tionally infeasible to compute cred, even if id, data and 𝑓()
are public. By using a formal notation, that is
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨Pr {cred | 𝑓 (cred ‖id‖ data) , id, data, 𝑓 ()} − Pr {cred}
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
≤ negl (𝑛) ,
(3)
where negl(𝑛) is a negligible function with parameter 𝑛.
Pr{𝐴 | 𝐵}means given 𝐵 the probability of event𝐴 (i.e., gues-
sing right 𝐴). That is, any polynomial probabilistic
Turing machine (PPTM) with parameter 𝑛 cannot guess
cred with noneligible probability, no matter whether
𝑓(cred‖id‖data), id, data, 𝑓() are given or not.
(2) Second-Preimage Resistance. Without cred, it is com-
putationally infeasible to find another id󸀠(id󸀠 ̸= id) such that
𝑓(cred‖id󸀠‖data) = 𝑓(cred‖id‖data), even if data, id and
𝑓() are public. Similarly, without cred, it is computation-
ally infeasible to find another data󸀠(data󸀠 ̸= data satisfying
𝑓(cred‖id‖data) = 𝑓(cred‖id‖data󸀠), even if data, id and 𝑓()
are public. That is,
Pr {id󸀠 ̸= id, 𝑓 (cred 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩id
󸀠󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩
data)
= 𝑓 (cred ‖id‖ data) | data, id, 𝑓 () } ≤ negl (𝑛) ,
Pr {data󸀠 ̸= data, 𝑓 (𝑐red ‖id‖ data󸀠)
= 𝑓 (cred ‖id‖ data) | data, id, 𝑓 () } ≤ negl (𝑛) .
(4)
Certainly, 𝑓(cred‖id‖data) can be easily computed if
cred, id, and data are available, especially for resource con-
straint devices in M2M context. 𝑓() can be instantiated
with cryptographic primitives such as one-way function with
second-preimage resistance, pseudorandom function, and
trapdoor permutation.
Credential-based model can be further divided into two
folders: one credential-based model and multicredential-
based model. As it is named, multicredential-based model
use multiple credentials in eachMSGcbm message or distinct
credential in multipleMSGcbm messages.
For only guaranteeing the entity
authentication, MSGcbm can be changed to
MSG󸀠cbm : P → V : {id, data, tag = 𝑓(cred‖id)};
Similarly, for only guaranteeing the message
authentication, MSGcbm can be changed to
MSG󸀠󸀠cbm : P → V : {id, data, tag = 𝑓(cred‖data)}.
Analysis
Definition 6 (Soundness). The designed protocol can guaran-
tee the required security. That is, the designed protocol is the
sufficient condition of the required security.
Definition 7 (Completeness). The required security needs the
designed protocol to guarantee.That is, the designed protocol
is the necessary condition of the required security.
Proposition 8. Credential-based model Π
𝑐𝑏𝑚
is secure in
Attack
𝑐𝑒
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑐𝑒
,Π
𝑐𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl (𝑛) . (5)
Proof. It can be proofed by similar methods in Universally
Composable security [14]; hereby only sketch is given. The
security of the proposed model is guaranteed by the security
of 𝑓(). The rationale is from the Turing Test. There exist a
reality model and an ideal model. From the viewpoint of
environmental machine, if the reality model and ideal model
are indistinguishable, the realitymodel will reach the security
of the ideal model. In reality model, there exist adversary,
prover, and verifier running protocol; In ideal model, there
exist ideal function that emulates the protocol, dummyprover
and dummy verifier, and simulated adversary that emulates
all possible interactions and attacks. Ideal function is always
secure (it is regarded as an imaged trusted third party). If the
ideal model and reality model are indistinguishable from the
viewpoint of environmentalmachine, the security of protocol
will be guaranteed.
In other words, if environmentalmachine can distinguish
the reality model and the ideal model, a new adversary can be
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created to subvert a certain security assumption by revoking
the environmental machine as a subfunction. In the ideal
function, 𝑓() is perfectly secure. In the reality model, 𝑓() is
assumed to satisfy certain security requirements (e.g., one-
wayness and preimage resistance). If the ideal model is indis-
tinguishable with reality model by environmental machine,
the adversary will subvert the assumption by consulting the
environmental machine. Finally, the proposition proofs the
soundness of credential-based model.
Proposition 9. Credential-based model has completeness for
defending Channel Eavesdropping Attack.
Proof. The proof has two folders: the credential is required;
the credential is presented properly. On the one hand, as
devices need to distinguish themselves with others, they need
to show their secretly possessed knowledge—credential—to
proof their identity. Thus, there must exist a credential in the
tuples in MSGcbm on the transcripts 𝑇𝑖. On the other hand,
the credential must be secretly and properly presented, as
the interaction tape 𝑇
𝑖
can be tampered by eavesdropping
adversary Ace. Thus, the presence of credential relies on 𝑓()
that has one-wayness and second-preimage resistance.
Besides, multicredential-based model is securer than
one credential-based model. That is, the exposure of one
credential by eavesdropping adversary Ace will only result
in subverting the authentication security guaranteed by that
credential. If P has multiple credentials, the exposure of
credentials will become more difficult. It is natural to extend
the security discussion to following statement.
Definition 10 (Forward Authentication Security). That is, if
current credential is exposed by eavesdropping adversary
Ace, the authentication security before exposure is still
guaranteed.
Proposition 11. In Attack
𝑐𝑒
, multiple credentials that derive
from one-way function can guarantee forward authentication
security.
Proof. By using one-way function 𝑓, cred
𝑖
= 𝑓(cred
𝑖−1
), (1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑛), where cred
0
= cred. The sequence of using cred is
from cred
𝑛
to cred
0
. Due to the one-wayness of 𝑓(), it can
guarantee the confidentiality of previous credentials, even if
current used credential is revealed byAce.
Proposition 12. Credential-based modelΠ
𝑐𝑏𝑚
is not secure in
Attack
𝑐𝑒
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑐𝑐
,Π
𝑐𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] > negl (𝑛) . (6)
Proof (Straightforward). The authentication security of
credential-based model relies on the secrecy of credentials.
The presence of Acc will reveal all credentials. Thus, the
authentication security is broken.
3.2. Defending Credential Compromising Attack: Machine-
Metrics Based Model (MBM). If the attack model is strength-
ened to Attackcc, the credential-based model will not be able
to guarantee the security of authentication, as it is proofed in
previous proposition.
For simple illustration of Attackcc, we first point out an
attack method called relocation attack.
Definition 13 (Credential Relocation Attack). It is an attack
that the credentials are relocated to anther device. Although
the received {id‖data‖tag} is verified valid at V, the data do
not come from the device with claimed id; indeed, the data
come from another device with different id.
To tackle the Attackcc, we propose a machine-metric
based model (MBM). In this MBM model, the physical
characteristics of devices are collected as the identifica-
tion of devices. Suppose the physical characteristic space
is 𝑆, which consists of 𝑛 characteristics. That is, 𝑆 =
{char
1
, char
2
, . . . , char
𝑛
}. Software program prgm
𝑖
() returns
char
𝑖
∈ 𝑆, (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛). The machine-metrics based model
is described as follows:
MSGmbm :P󳨀→V : {id, data, 𝑖, tag=𝑓(prgm𝑖 () ‖id‖ data)} ,
V : Verify (id, data, tag) ?= 1,
(7)
where Verify() is a tag verification function (we assume V
securely possesses a table Tbl = ⟨𝑖, char
𝑖
⟩, (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛),
and fetches char
𝑖
according to index 𝑖 to verify received
tag); MSGmbm is a message from device P to V; prgm𝑖() is
securely computed at functional module inP and it returns
a characteristic char
𝑖
as a credential of P; 𝑓() is a function
with one-wayness and second-preimage resistance; note that
𝑓() can be securely computed by functional module.
If we look char
𝑖
as a credential in CBM model,
we will have similar discussion as follows. prgm
𝑖
() and
𝑓(prgm
𝑖
()‖id‖data), (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛) can be easily computed,
especially for resource constraint devices in M2M context.
𝑓() can be instantiated with cryptographic primitives such as
one-way function with second-preimage resistance, pseudo-
random function, and trapdoor permutation.
Machine-metrics basedmodel can be further divided into
two folders: one Machine-Metrics based model and multiple
Machine-Metrics based model. As it is named, multiple
Machine-Metrics based model use multiple prgm
𝑖
() in each
MSGmbm message or distinct prgm𝑖() in multiple MSGmbm
messages.
For only guaranteeing the entity authentication,
MSGmbm can be changed to MSG
󸀠
mbm : P → V : {id, data,
𝑖, tag = 𝑓(prgm
𝑖
()‖id)}; Similarly, for only guaranteeing
the message authentication, MSGmbm can be changed to
MSG󸀠󸀠mbm : P → V : {id, data, 𝑖, tag = 𝑓(prgm𝑖()‖data)}.
Analysis
Proposition 14. Machine-Metrics basedmodelΠ
𝑚𝑏𝑚
is secure
in Attack
𝑐𝑐
. That is, Pr[AuthFoolA
𝑐𝑐
,Π
𝑚𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl(𝑛).
Proof. As the function module is secure, adversary cannot
compute prgm
𝑖
(), (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛). It can be looked as a
computed credential to guarantee the authentication security.
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The proof thus is reduced to the proof of the Proposition 8. It
proofs the soundness of Machine-Metrics based model.
Proposition 15. Machine-Metrics based Model has complete-
ness for defending Credential Compromising Attack.
Proof. Theproof can be reduced to the proof of Proposition 9.
Concretely, the proof has two folders: a new credential is
required; the new credential is presented properly. On the one
hand, as devices need to distinguish themselves with others,
they need to show their secretly possessed knowledge—
credential—to proof their identity. As the credential module
can be compromised, the credential must come from the
functional module. Thus, there must exist a credential in the
tuples in MSGmbm on the transcripts 𝑇𝑖. On the other hand,
the credential must be secretly and properly presented, as
the interaction tape 𝑇
𝑖
can be tampered by eavesdropping
adversary Ace. Thus, the presentation of credential relies
on 𝑓 that has one-wayness and second-preimage resistance.
Besides, if the credential is online computed (not stored) by
functional module, the security will be enhanced, which is
similar to the case of multiple credentials.
Similarly, multiple Machine-Metrics based model is
securer than one Machine-Metrics based model. The discus-
sion is similar to the one in the previous section. In summary,
Machine-Metrics based model can be looked as an analog of
biometric-based authentication for human.
Proposition 16. Machine-Metrics based model Π
𝑚𝑏𝑚
is not
secure in Attack
𝑓𝑐
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑓𝑐
,Π
𝑚𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] > negl (𝑛) . (8)
Proof (Straightforward). The authentication security of
Machine-Metrics based model relies on the secure
computation of prgm
𝑖
(), (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛). The presence
of Afc will reveal all prgm𝑖(), (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛). Thus, the
authentication security is broken.
We give three special illustrations on Machine-Metrics
based model for defending Attackcc (e.g., Credential Reloca-
tion Attack).
Definition 17 (Computation-Based Authentication). Each
time V sends a one-time random computational puzzle, P
counts the computation duration time in microsecond or
Central Process Unit (CPU) cycles as the result of prgm
𝑖
().
Example 18. V sends a computational puzzle 𝑔𝑛 mod 𝑝,
where 𝑝 is a prime number; 2 < 𝑔 < 𝑝 is an integer; 𝑛 < 𝑝 is
a positive integer. P counts the computation duration time
in microsecond as the computation characteristic, in other
words, the returning result of prgm
𝑖
().
Definition 19 (Location-Based Authentication). V sends an
one-time random location puzzle. P returns computed
location values. V verifies the location characteristic of P.
That is, prgm
𝑖
() returns location values ofP.
Example 20. V sends an one-time random location puzzle:
the distance fromP to a randomly chosen point.P computes
the distance value according to its location values such as
global positions and latitudes, as the location characteristic,
in other words, the returning result of prgm
𝑖
().
Similarly, we can further define authentication methods
by requesting other physical characteristics such as memory
size, hardware fingerprints. Note that such kind of requesting
must be fresh and generated at real time.
3.3. Defending Function Compromising Attack: Reference-
Based Model (RBM). If the attack model is strengthened to
Attackfc, the Machine-Metrics based model will not be able
to guarantee the security of authentication, which is proofed
in previous proposition.
To illustrate Attackfc, we first point out two concrete
attack methods called Characteristic Replication Attack and
Data Pollution Attack.
Definition 21 (Characteristic Replication Attack). The set 𝑆 =
{char
𝑖
, . . . , char
𝑛
} is replicated to another device by attackers,
and they will choose corresponding char
𝑖
by elements upon
revoking of prgm
𝑖
().
Definition 22 (Data Pollution Attack). Data is polluted by
attackers, although the credential is valid to make the data
being authenticated. That is, P → V : {id, data󸀠, tag =
𝑓(cred‖id, ‖data󸀠)}, where data is changed to data󸀠 by adver-
sary Attackfc after functional module is compromised.
To tackle the Attackfc, we propose a reference-based
model (RBM). In RBM model, the reference behavior of P
(e.g., from previous data or other devices) will be checked for
the trustworthiness of data.
The reference-based model is described as follows:
MSGrbm : P 󳨀→V : {id, data, tag = 𝑓 (cred ‖id‖ data)} ,
V : Verify () ?= 1,
(9)
where the Verify() includes a tag verification function
Verify(tag) and especially, an extra verification function for
data, called Verify(data).
We give two special illustration on reference-basedmodel
in the following.
Definition 23 (History-Based Authentication). The authenti-
cator V verifies the history behaviors (e.g., data) to authen-
ticate the trustworthiness of current behavior of P, for
example, the trustworthiness of data. Concretely, the data
filter method can be applied atV, where data come from the
history.
Example 24. Suppose the history set is 𝑆, which consists of 𝑛
values. That is, 𝑆 = {𝑣
1
, 𝑣
2
, . . . , 𝑣
𝑛
}. Suppose the history set is
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trustworthy, the detection of abnormal data can be done by
the following verification function:
Verify (data) = iff( (data − 𝑣)
2
∑
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
(𝑣
𝑖
− 𝑣)
2
< th, 1, 0) , (10)
where th is an alert threshold.
Definition 25 (Neighbor-Based Authentication). The authen-
ticator V verifies the other P’s behaviors (e.g., neighbors’
reporting data) to authenticate the trustworthiness of current
behavior of P, for example, the trustworthiness of data.
Concretely, the data filter method can be applied atV, where
the data come from neighbors.
Example 26. Similar to above example, suppose the neighbor
set is 𝑆, which consists of 𝑛 values.That is, 𝑆 = {𝑣
1
, 𝑣
2
, . . . , 𝑣
𝑛
}.
Suppose the neighbor set is trustworthy, the detection of
abnormal data can be done by the following verification
function:
Verify (data) = iff( (data − 𝑣)
2
∑
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
(𝑣
𝑖
− 𝑣)
2
< th, 1, 0) , (11)
where th is an alert threshold.
In the neighbor-based authentication, the reference set 𝑆
may not be always trustworthy. That is, the values in 𝑆 may
come from otherPs that are untrustworthy. To deal with this
issue, we propose extra two methods in the following.
Definition 27 (Trustworthy Stunt Authentication). The 𝑆
is from other trustworthy Ps that are predeployed. That
is, the authenticator V verifies the trusted stunt’s report
(e.g., data) to authenticate the trustworthiness of current
behavior ofP, for example, the trustworthiness of data. The
verification function in this situation is similar to history-
based Authentication.
Definition 28 (Threshold Stunt Authentication). Suppose
there exists at least 𝛼 nodes in 𝑆 that are trustworthy (i.e.,
not compromised) in neighbor-based authentication. Simply
speaking, the verification function can be designed as follows:
select the median 𝑆 − 𝛼 values in 𝑆 and then use verification
function similarly.
Analysis
Proposition 29. Reference-based model Π
𝑟𝑏𝑚
is secure in
Attack
𝑓𝑐
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑓𝑐
,Π
𝑟𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl (𝑛) . (12)
Proof. The message source authentication is guaranteed
by Proposition 8. The message integrity authentication is
roughly guaranteed by history-based authentication and
neighbor-based authentication in reference-based model. It
proofs the soundness of reference-based model.
Proposition 30. Reference-based Model has completeness for
defending Function Compromising Attack.
Proof. As functional module can be compromised by Agc,
computational credential (namely, prgm
𝑖
() or char
𝑖
) may be
revealed, which is so-called characteristic replication attack.
Besides, even though credentials in credential module can
grantee that data cannot be modified by adversaries in the
channel, the data can still be modified at the devices after
the functional module is compromised, which is so-called
data pollution attack. Thus, credentials in credential module
defend against the former one; history-based authentication
and neighbor-based authentication defend against the latter
one.
Proposition 31. Reference-based model Π
𝑟𝑏𝑚
is not secure in
Attack
𝑔𝑐
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑔𝑐
,Π
𝑟𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] > negl (𝑛) . (13)
Proof (Straightforward). As the credential module can be
compromised in Agc, the authentication security is bro-
ken.
3.4. Defending Ghost Compromising Attack: Witness-Based
Model (WBM). If the adversary has the most powerful
strength, namely, the Attackgc. We point out it cannot be
defended against by any authentication enhancementmethod
only fromP.
Proposition 32. Attack
𝑔𝑐
cannot be defended only byP itself.
Proof (Straightforward). As the credential module and func-
tional module can both be compromised, any security
enhancement will be also compromised. Thus, Attackgc can-
not be defended only byP itself merely.
To tackle theAttackgc, we propose a witness-based model
(WBM). In WBM model, environmental characteristics and
device characteristics are both collected for the final authen-
tication decision.
Suppose environmental characteristics consist of 𝑛 com-
ponents. That is, 𝑆
𝑒
= {envr
1
, envr
2
, . . . , envr
𝑛
}. There exists
at least one program wtns
𝑖
() that can return envr
𝑖
∈ 𝑆
𝑒
, (𝑖 =
1, . . . , 𝑛). In addition, suppose the device characteristics space
is 𝑆
𝑑
, which consists of 𝑛 characteristics. That is, 𝑆
𝑑
=
{char
1
, char
2
, . . . , char
𝑛
}. There exists at least one program
prgm
𝑖
() that can return char
𝑖
∈ 𝑆
𝑑
, (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛).Thewitness-
based model is described as follows:
MSGwbm : P 󳨀→V : {id, data, tag
= 𝑓 (cred || prgm
𝑖 () ‖id‖ data)} ,
V : Verify (id, data, tag) ?= 1,
(14)
where the Verify() includes a tag verification function
Verify(tag), a data verification function Verify(data), and an
environment verification function Verify(envr).
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Table 2: Comparison of attack models and authentication models.
Authentication model Attack model
(Authentication illustration) (Attack illustration)
Credential-based model Channel eavesdropping attack
Machine-metrics-based model Credential compromising attack
(Computation-based authentication) (Credential relocation attack)
(Location-based authentication)
Reference-based model Function compromising attack
(History-based authentication) (Characteristic replication attack)
(Neighbor-based authentication) (Data pollution attack)
(Trustworthy stunt authentication)
(Threshold stunt authentication)
Witness-based model Ghost compromising attack
(Contamination-based authentication)
Table 3: Security comparison of models.
Authentication model Authentication security
CBM Pr[AuthFoolAce , Πcbm (𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl(𝑛)
Pr[AuthFoolAcc , Πcbm (𝑛) = 1] > negl(𝑛)
MBM Pr[AuthFoolAcc , Πmbm (𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl(𝑛)
Pr[AuthFoolAfc , Πmbm (𝑛) = 1] > negl(𝑛)
RBM Pr[AuthFoolAfc , Πrbm (𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl(𝑛)
Pr[AuthFoolAgc , Πrbm (𝑛) = 1] > negl(𝑛)
WBM Pr[AuthFoolAgc , Πwbm (𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl(𝑛)
We give an illustration for the witness-based authentica-
tion in the following.
Definition 33 (Contamination-Based Authentication). The
authentication is provided by witness from other trustworthy
peers in different channels.
Example 34. The authenticator V verifies whether P is
touched or moved via the observation of protection lock
or surveillance video camera. For example, wtns
1
() returns
lock status (suppose locked status is 1); wtns
2
() returns
whether camera picture is in static status (suppose static
status is 1 means the monitored device is untouched). The
Verify(envr) = wtns
1
() .AND. wtns
2
().
Analysis
Proposition 35. Witness-based model Π
𝑤𝑏𝑚
is secure in
Attack
𝑔𝑐
. That is,
Pr [AuthFoolA
𝑔𝑐
,Π
𝑤𝑏𝑚
(𝑛) = 1] ≤ negl (𝑛) . (15)
Proof (Sketch). As the proof of authentication relies on the
witness from others who are not compromised, the authen-
tication security can be guaranteed. It proofs the soundness
of witness-based model.
Proposition 36. Witness-based Model has completeness for
defending Ghost Compromising Attack.
Proof (Sketch). As the P can be totally compromised, the
security enhancement for authentication must come from
other trustworthy entities.
Comparison.The security comparison of proposed models is
compared and summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
4. Related Work
Security of M2M communications starts to attract more and
more attentions [4, 5, 7, 8], but solutions for authentication in
M2M context have not been thoroughly explored. Especially,
the formal authentication models for M2M have been rarely
discussed. In this paper, we made the first attempt in this
regard. Zhang et al. [12] provided a practical group-based
authentication for Machine Type Communication (MTC)
scenario. Each device shares a secret key with home envi-
ronment, and a group secret key with other devices in the
same group. Their discussion focused on roaming cellular
networks and human may be involved. He [10] proposed
to use machine’s fingerprint and encryption technique to
conduct remote register authentication of software to prevent
unauthorized use. It focused on software copyright safeguard.
Lu et al. [5] first pointed out the reliability and security
requirements in M2M communications. Many other works
addressed security problems in smart grid scenarios, which
may be related to M2M communications. For example, Fad-
lullah et al. [15] studied the detection of malicious activities
in smart grid communication and proposed an early warning
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system. Bartoli et al. [16] studied secure aggregation in smart
grid M2M networks. They included the security design in
the physical layer and MAC layer. Saied et al. [8] proposed
a key establishment solution for heterogeneous M2M com-
munications. Other works explored the security in a broader
domain—IoT, which is relevant to M2M. For example, Alam
et al. [17] studied the interoperability in security attributes
between different administrative domains in IoT. They pro-
posed a layered architecture of IoT framework. As the M2M
is still undergoing development, several works studied M2M
standards [6, 18–20]. For example, Bartoli et al. [6] reviewed
the current undergoing standards forM2M communications.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we made the first attempt to propose a family of
formal models to authenticate devices in M2M context. We
first modeled four attacking adversaries that can include all
possible attacks in M2M. Next, we proposed four models to
tackle corresponding adversaries. We also illustrated several
concrete attacking methods and authentication approaches.
We proofed the authentication security for all proposed
models and compared them for clarity. Ourmodels presented
soundness and completeness with respect to necessary and
sufficient conditions for authentication security, which can
guide the design and analysis of concrete authentication pro-
tocols. Especially, we constructed a uniform authentication
framework for possible various authentication approaches.
Ourmodel also pointed out all possible authenticationmech-
anisms or sufficient solutions for authentications in M2M.
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